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Consciousness, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Free Will 




Abstract: One body of research in experimental philosophy indicates that non-philosophers by 
and large do not employ the concept of phenomenal consciousness. Another body of research, 
however, suggests that people treat phenomenal consciousness as essential for having free will. 
In this chapter, we explore the tension between these findings. We suggest that the dominant, 
ordinary usages of ‘consciousness’ concern notions of being awake, aware, and exercising 
control, all of which bear a clear connection to free will. Based on this, we argue that findings 
purporting to show that people take the capacity for phenomenal consciousness to be necessary 
for free will are better interpreted in terms of a non-phenomenal understanding of consciousness. 
We explore this suggestion by calling on extant work on the dimensions of mind perception, and 




There is a tension between some recent work in experimental philosophy concerning how non-
philosophers conceptualize mental states and work on the relationship between attributions of 
consciousness and free will. While researchers are not in complete agreement about how 
‘phenomenal consciousness’ should be understood, the standard idea is that a mental state is 
phenomenally conscious just in case there is “something it is like” (Nagel 1974) to be in that 
state, with this being understood in terms of the state having phenomenal qualities. A growing 
body of evidence, however, suggests that non-philosophers do not tend to employ this 
philosophical concept (e.g., Sytsma and Machery 2010, Sytsma and Ozdemir 2019). This work 
shows that non-philosophers do not tend to categorize mental states in the way that philosophers 
do, distinguishing between those states that are phenomenally conscious and those that are not. 
At the same time, another body of evidence has been taken to indicate that non-philosophers 
typically treat the possession of phenomenal consciousness as a necessary condition for freely 
willed action (e.g., Shepherd 2015, Nahmias et al. 2020). But if non-philosophers don’t employ 
the concept of phenomenal consciousness, then they couldn’t treat phenomenal consciousness as 
a necessary condition for free will; and if they do treat it as a necessary condition, then 
researchers arguing they don’t employ such a concept must be mistaken. 
 
1 Forthcoming in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action edited by Paul Henne and Samual Murray. We 
want to thank the editors for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
2 
 
In this chapter we explore this tension. We begin in Section 1 by noting that terms like 
‘consciousness’ are ambiguous, and we distinguish between senses that concern notions like 
being awake, aware, and exercising control and the sense that philosophers have tended to focus 
on—phenomenal consciousness—suggesting that the former corresponds with the dominant 
usages outside of academia. We then survey the empirical evidence indicating that non-
philosophers do not tend to categorize mental states in the way we would except if they 
recognize the (supposed) phenomenality of certain mental states. In Section 2, we discuss recent 
studies of free will attribution that suggest a close connection between these attributions and 
judgments about consciousness, focusing on work that interprets this in terms of phenomenal 
consciousness and especially phenomenally conscious emotions. We critically examine this 
research, arguing that the evidence does not clearly support the conclusion. Finally, in Section 3, 
we suggest a different picture on which consciousness and free will are treated as more 
biologically basic features of living animals. We then report the results of a new study building 
off Ozdemir’s (2021) work on the dimensions of mind perception.  
 
1. Concepts of Consciousness 
The English word ‘consciousness’ is used in a number of different ways. As Ned Block (1995, 
227) famously notes, “the concept of consciousness is a hybrid, or better, a mongrel concept.” 
Similarly, David Chalmers states that “the term ‘consciousness’ is ambiguous, referring to a 
number of different phenomena,” including that “sometimes it is used synonymously with 
‘awakeness’” and “sometimes it is closely tied to our ability to focus attention, or to voluntarily 
control our behavior” (1996, 6). Each of these senses readily suggest a connection to free will, 
either as a precondition for it (one must be awake to act freely) or more directly (exhibiting 
voluntary control of behavior presumably being a hallmark of free action). And each sense is 
suggested by standard dictionary entries. For instance, the full set of definitions for the adjective 
‘conscious’ given by Oxford’s free English dictionary reads as follows: 
1. Aware of and responding to one’s surroundings; awake. 
 
1.1 Having knowledge of something; aware. 
 
1.2 (conscious of) Painfully aware of; sensitive to. 
 




1.4 (of an action or feeling) deliberate and intentional. 
 
1.5 (of the mind or a thought) directly perceptible to and under the control of the person 
concerned.2 
 
Here, definition 1 corresponds with awakeness, while the focus on awareness (as well as in 1.1 
and 1.2) is suggestive of attention, and “deliberate and intentional” in 1.4 indicates voluntary 
action. Further, similar definitions are found for related terms like ‘consciously’ (e.g., “in a 
deliberate and intentional way”) and ‘consciousness’ (e.g, “the state of being awake and aware of 
one’s surroundings”).3 And a preliminary corpus investigation is in line with such definitions.4 
Using the word2vec semantic space for non-academic portions of the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English built by Sytsma et al. (2019), we find that the nearest neighbor—the term that 
the model suggests has the closest meaning to ‘consciousness’ based on the contexts in which 
they are used—is ‘awareness,’ while other nearby neighbors include ‘wakefulness.’5    
 While a full and careful analysis of the ordinary use of terms like ‘consciousness’ is 
beyond the scope of the present chapter, we take the preceding to suggest that the dominant 
usages relate to being awake, aware, and exercising control. Philosophers of mind, however, 
have most commonly been concerned with another sense of ‘consciousness’ that does not clearly 
coincide with the definitions seen above—what is typically referred to as ‘phenomenal 
consciousness.’ This is the sense that both Block and Chalmers are concerned with, with each 
author raising the comparison in part to note the potential for confusion and to urge that we need 
to be careful in reasoning about consciousness. And, in fact, recent work on psycholinguistic 
 
2 Accessed through Lexico.com, 3 June 2021, using the US dictionary. Similar sets of definitions are found for other 
online dictionaries, as noted in the supplemental materials. 
3 From Lexico.com using the US dictionary, accessed 3 June 2021.  
4 Corpus analysis involves the use of large collections of text for assessing some research question. For instance, the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English contains over one billion words drawn in a balanced ways from a 
variety of sources, including spoken English, fiction, popular magazines and newspapers, and academic texts. Terms 
in the corpus are searchable, including by part of speech and proximity to other terms, and provide the context for 
utterances of interest. Such a corpus offers a cross-section of “words in the wild,” as it were, providing a means of 
assessing linguistic hypotheses outside of an experimental setting and, hence, free of the potential biases such a 
setting might introduce. The full text for the corpus is also available and can be used to develop computational 
models of word meaning by looking at the relative distribution of words across the corpus, such as the distributional 
model employed here. For a discussion of the value of corpus analysis for philosophy, see Bluhm (2016) and Caton 
(2020). And, for an extended discussion of corpus methods, see McEnery and Wilson (2001). For an introduction to 
distributional semantic models see Erk (2012) and Turney and Pantel (2010). 
5 The ten nearest neighbors of “consciousness” in decreasing order of similarity as measured by the cosine of the 
vectors (in parentheses) are: “awareness” (.69), “unconsciousness” (.65), “wakefulness” (.62), “realization” (.59), 
“psyche” (.59), “transcendence” (.59), “selfhood” (.59), “subconscious” (.59), “emotion” (.58), and “aliveness” (.58). 
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biases indicates that people are prone to make inferences licensed only by the dominant or most 
common sense of a term even when it is used in a subordinate sense (Fischer and Engelhardt 
2017, 2020; Fischer and Sytsma 2021; Fischer et al. forthcoming). So, indeed, caution is 
warranted. 
What is the (supposed) phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness? While phenomenal 
consciousness has been a focus of fierce debate in contemporary philosophy of mind, researchers 
are not in complete agreement about how it should be understood. Nonetheless, the standard idea 
is that a range of mental states have something important in common: there is “something it is 
like” (Nagel 1974) to undergo these states, with this being understood in terms of their having 
certain introspectively accessible qualities (‘phenomenal qualities’ or ‘qualia’ for short), such as 
the redness we’re acquainted with in looking at a ripe tomato. The phrase ‘phenomenal 
consciousness’ is, thus, generally taken to characterize a diverse range of mental states as having 
something important in common—each having phenomenal qualities—and this feature is taken 
to distinguish these mental states from others that lack such qualities. While there is 
disagreement about exactly what range of states have phenomenal qualities, they are 
prototypically taken to include perceptual states and bodily sensations and to exclude at least 
some intentional states. As Chalmers puts it (2018, 7), “it is widely accepted that seeing a bright 
red square and feeling pain are phenomenally conscious, and that one’s ordinary background 
beliefs (my belief that Paris is in France, say, when I am not thinking about the matter) are not.”  
 
1.1 Attributions of Consciousness  
It is often assumed that while phrases like ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and terms like ‘qualia’ 
are clearly technical, the underlying concepts are nonetheless widespread among non-
philosophers, and this assumption is made by both skeptics and realists. For instance, Dennett 
(2005, 27) suggests that belief in qualia is part of our “folk theory of consciousness.” On the 
other end of the spectrum, qualia realists generally take the occurrence of such qualities to be 
both introspectively obvious and of clear importance. As Chalmers (1995, 207) puts it, qualia are 
“the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives.” If this is correct, then we would 
expect the concept of phenomenal consciousness to play a central role in our folk psychological 
conception of mind. And, in fact, Chalmers (2018, 13) makes this expectation clear, suggesting 
that “the central intuitions [about phenomenal consciousness] are widely shared well beyond 
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philosophy” and contending that “it is highly plausible that versions of many of these intuitions 
can be teased out of ordinary subjects.” While Chalmers is focused on what he terms “problem 
intuitions” here—intuitions reflecting that we take there to be a problem of phenomenal 
consciousness, including judgments that it is distinctively hard to explain or is non-physical—
such intuitions presuppose a conception of phenomenal consciousness that is suitably close to the 
philosophical concept.6 
Further, there is some supporting evidence for such claims about the folk theory of 
consciousness. Knobe and Prinz (2008) present results suggesting that non-philosophers employ 
the concept of phenomenal consciousness. Most notably, in their second study they gave 
participants a series of ten statements attributing mental states to a corporation—five that they 
classified as phenomenal and five that they classified as non-phenomenal—and asked them to 
rate how weird sounding the statements were. Knobe and Prinz found that on average each of the 
phenomenal statements was judged to sound less natural than each of the non-phenomenal 
statements.7 Another body of evidence, however, suggests that non-philosophers do not tend to 
employ a concept that is relevantly akin to the philosophical one. Evidence for this was first put 
forward by Sytsma and Machery (2010), and as detailed below, their contention has since gained 
further support from a range of follow-up studies, as well as work on beliefs about perception 
and studies on the dimensions of mind perception.  
Sytsma and Machery (2010) argue that if the existence of phenomenal consciousness is 
pretheoretically obvious and is a central part of our folk psychological conception of mental life, 
then we would expect the distinction between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states to be clear 
in how people categorize mental states. To test this hypothesis, in their first study Sytsma and 
Machery gave philosophers and non-philosophers a description of either a simple, non-humanoid 
robot or an ordinary human performing one of two simple tasks. The tasks were designed to 
 
6 We’ll focus on the prior question of whether non-philosophers tend to possess such a conception of phenomenal 
consciousness. If they do not, of course, then it will also follow that they lack further problem intuitions about 
phenomenal consciousness. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that people do tend to have such a 
conception, recent empirical work suggests that the majority do not harbor problem intuitions (Peressini 2014, 
Gottlieb and Lombrozo 2018, Fischer and Sytsma 2021, Ozdemir 2021, Diaz forthcoming).  
7 A number of notable criticisms have been raised against Knobe and Prinz’s interpretation of these results, however, 
including Sytsma and Machery (2009), Arico (2010), and Phelan et al. (2013). Further evidence for non-
philosophers potentially having a concept of phenomenal consciousness is provided by Peressini (2014), although he 
holds that “folk phenomenality is importantly different from the philosophical sense in that it is grounded in the 
physical as opposed to the metaphysical nature of the experiencer” (883). See Sytsma (2014) for a discussion of 
these works and Sytsma (ms) for an extended critique of Peressini’s studies. 
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elicit the judgment that the human had underwent a prototypical phenomenal state—either seeing 
red or feeling pain—and the robot was described as behaving in an analogous manner. 
Participants were then asked about whether the agent had the relevant state. 
 As expected, philosophers tended to treat the two states similarly, ascribing both to the 
ordinary human and denying both of the simple robot. In contrast, participants with little to no 
training in philosophy did not treat them similarly: although they tended to ascribe both states to 
the ordinary human, they were split with regard to the simple robot, tending to ascribe one 
prototypical phenomenal state to it (seeing red), while tending to deny the other (feeling pain). 
These results have subsequently been replicated and expanded upon (Sytsma and Machery 2012, 
Sytsma 2012, Sytsma and Ozdemir 2019, Cova et al. 2021, Ozdemir 2021). This includes that 
key results have been found regardless of how reflective the participants are (Sytsma and 
Machery 2012 responding to Talbot 2012), when using an expanded range of questions to allow 
participants to distinguish between merely detecting and truly seeing (Sytsma 2013 responding to 
Fiala et al. 2013), when using phrasings expected by critics to more clearly indicate phenomenal 
consciousness (“experience red,” “experience pain”; Sytsma and Ozdemir 2019), and on larger 
cross-cultural samples (Sytsma and Ozdemir 2019, Ozdemir 2021). 
 
1.2 Dimensions of Mind Perception 
The results reported by Sytsma and Machery (2010), and supported by subsequent follow-up 
work, suggest that by and large non-philosophers do not tend to treat two prototypical examples 
of phenomenal states as having something important in common. Given standard justifications 
for taking the supposed phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness seriously in the first place—
that it is central and manifest—finding that non-philosophers do not tend to treat two 
prototypical examples of supposed phenomenal states similarly in turn suggests that they do not 
share the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness.  
This conclusion gains further support from two sources. First, research suggests that non-
philosophers tend to hold a naïve view of both colors and pains, treating these as qualities of 
extra-cranial objects rather than qualities of mental states (Sytsma 2009, 2010, 2012; Reuter 
2011; Reuter et al. 2014, 2019; Kim et al. 2016; Sytsma and Reuter 2017; Reuter and Sytsma 
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2020; Goldberg et al. forthcoming).8 Since the standard understanding of phenomenal qualities 
treats them as qualities of mental states, this work suggests that people do not generally think of 
colors and pains as being phenomenal. But, given that these are two prototypical examples of 
phenomenal qualities, this raises further doubts about whether they employ such a concept in the 
first place. 
Second, recent work on the dimensions of mind perception suggests that the way non-
philosophers tend to attribute various mental states does not respect the philosophical division 
between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states (Weisman et al. 2017, Malle 2019, Ozdemir 
2021). This work seeks to uncover the conceptual structures that frame how people conceive of 
mental life by looking at patterns of similarity and difference in the capacities they attribute to a 
range of entities. If the concept of phenomenal consciousness is a central part of folk 
psychology, then we would expect people to treat clear examples of phenomenal states as 
tending to hang together. For instance, like the philosophers surveyed by Sytsma and Machery 
(2010), we would expect them to treat simple robots as being incapable of any phenomenal 
states, while treating ordinary humans as being capable of the full range of typical phenomenal 
states. But this is not what we find: across a range of studies, prototypical examples of 
phenomenal states are found to fall across different dimensions. 
While the pioneering work on dimensions of mind perception by Gray et al. (2007) 
suggests that there are two distinct dimensions, subsequent work often suggests three or more 
dimensions, although the exact character of these differs somewhat. Weisman et al. (2017) 
conducted a series of four studies asking people about whether a range of entities—such as a 
stapler, robot, beetle, adult human—were capable of each of 40 mental capacities. Across these 
studies, they found a consistent three-dimensional structure to participants’ attributions, which 
they termed Body, Heart, and Mind. Most importantly for present purposes, while the capacities 
tested included many that philosophers would typically classify as phenomenal, these were 
spread across the three dimensions. To illustrate, the Body dimension, which Weisman and 
colleagues characterize in terms of “physiological sensations related to biological needs, as well 
as the kinds of self-initiated behavior needed to pursue these needs” (11375), included such 
“phenomenal” capacities as experiencing pain and experiencing pleasure. The Heart dimension 
 
8 But see Borg et al. (2019), Salomons et al. (forthcoming), and Liu (forthcoming) for responses that suggest a more 
complicated picture for pains. 
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was characterized in terms of “basic and social emotions, as well as the kinds of social-cognitive 
and self-regulatory abilities required of a social partner and moral agent” (11375), and included 
feeling embarrassed. And the Mind dimension, characterized in terms of “perceptual-cognitive 
abilities to detect and use information about the environment” (11375), included sensing 
temperatures and seeing things. Weisman et al.’s goal here was to use patterns of attributions to 
the different entities “to infer which mental capacities were seen as related and which were 
considered independent” (11375). Focusing on phenomenal states, their results then suggest that 
people tend to consider some prototypical examples as being independent of one another. 
 Malle (2019) also arrived at and replicated a three-dimensional structure across a series 
of five studies involving attributions of a different set of capacities to a variety of entities. While 
the dimensions he found are largely consistent with those identified by Weisman et al., they 
differ in some details and were given different labels—Affect (including such prototypically 
phenomenal capacities as “feeling pain” and “feeling happy”), Moral & Social Cognition 
(including “feel shame or pride” in Study 1), and Reality Interaction (including “seeing and 
hearing the world”). The key point for present purposes, though, is that we once again find that 
capacities that philosophers would typically classify as phenomenal fell across different 
dimensions. Insofar as these dimensions capture “people’s folk conception of [how] the mind is 
organized” (2268), such findings again suggest that non-philosophers do not tend to divide up 
the mental world in a way that follows the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness.  
Finally, Ozdemir (2021) ran two studies exploring the dimensions of mind perception 
from an angle more inline with the philosophical discussions and thought experiments. In similar 
fashion to the studies on free will from Shepherd (2015) and Nahmias et al. (2020) that we will 
discuss below, participants were given a description of a highly sophisticated robot: 
Imagine that in the future scientists are able to exactly scan a person's brain at the 
molecular level. Using the information from the brain scan they can create a perfect 
computer simulation of the working brain. They can then embed that computer in a robot 
body to create a robot version of the person. 
Imagine that scientists scan your brain and use that information to create a robot version 
of you. On a scale of 0 (Not at all capable) to 6 (Highly capable), how capable would the 
robot be of… 
After reading the description, in Ozdemir’s first study participants were asked to rate the same 40 
capacities tested by Weisman and colleagues. He found a four-dimensional structure, similar to 
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those seen previously except for separate dimensions for Negative States (including experiencing 
pain and experiencing fear) and Positive States (including experiencing pleasure and feeling 
love). The other two dimensions were Perception and Cognition (including seeing things and 
sensing temperature) and Consciousness and Agency (which included no prototypically 
phenomenal capacities but did include being conscious). The capacities tested by Weisman and 
colleagues weren’t specifically designed with the philosophical distinction between phenomenal 
and non-phenomenal states in mind, however. As such, it might be worried that some of the 
items wouldn’t clearly suggest phenomenal states even if participants employ such a notion. 
Most notably “seeing things” might be interpreted in a purely informational sense along the lines 
of “detecting objects” rather than a phenomenal sense. Because of this, in his second study, 
Ozdemir used the same vignette as above, but included two statements involving seeing (“the 
robot would see colours,” “the robot would experience sights and sounds”). Against the worry, 
and in line with Sytsma and Ozdemir’s (2019) extension of Sytsma and Machery’s (2010) 
results, ratings for the ‘see’ and ‘experience’ statements were similar (M=6.07, M=5.75), while 
each was significantly different from ratings for the ‘pain’ statement (M=3.79); further, while 
‘see’ and ‘experience’ fell under the same dimension (Perception and Cognition), ‘pain’ was in a 
different dimension (Consciousness and Agency).   
 To summarize, we saw above that many philosophers hold that the concept of 
phenomenal consciousness is a central facet of the folk psychological conception of mind, with 
the existence of phenomenal consciousness being taken to be pretheoretically obvious and its 
occurrence of central importance to people, both philosophers and non-philosophers alike. If this 
is the case, then we would expect people to tend to treat at least prototypical examples of 
phenomenal states similarly, tending to deny them of entities that intuitively lack phenomenal 
consciousness and to ascribe them to entities that intuitively possess phenomenal consciousness. 
But this is not what the data suggests. Across a range of studies conducted by different 
researchers and using different materials and methods, we consistently find that prototypical 
examples of phenomenal states are treated differently; in fact, they seem to fall across different 
aspects of the folk conceptualization of mental life. This suggests, minimally, that the concept of 
phenomenal consciousness does not play a central role in the folk psychological conception of 
mind. Absent this, however, it is unclear why we should suppose that non-philosophers possess 
something like the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness in the first place. It of 
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course remains possible that they possess such a concept, even if they don’t systematically 
employ it when we would expect them to. Nonetheless, given that non-philosophers by and large 
don’t seem to carve up the mental world in the way we would expect if they were calling on the 
concept of phenomenal consciousness, we contend that we have defeasible reason for skepticism 
about such a concept being part of folk psychology. 
 
2. Free Will 
While the empirical evidence surveyed in the previous section suggests that the concept of 
phenomenal consciousness is not part of folk psychology, another prominent body of work in 
experimental philosophy seems to paint a different picture. A large body of research has sought 
to understand the ordinary concept of free will, and some of this work suggests that it bears a 
close relationship to judgments about consciousness, with some interpreting this in terms of 
phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Shepherd 2012, 2015; Nahmias et al. 2020). In this section 
we’ll survey this research, arguing that while it does indeed indicate a connection between the 
ordinary concept of free will and some notion of consciousness, it is at best unclear that that 
notion is phenomenal consciousness.  
 Consider the work of Shepherd (2012). He reports the results of three studies asking 
participants about a vignette that states that neuroscientists are convinced either that conscious or 
unconscious processes direct people’s actions, with the exact wording being varied across the 
studies. This manipulation had a sizable effect on judgments about free will in each study, with 
ratings being significantly higher in the conscious conditions than the unconscious conditions. 
Shepherd concludes from this that “consciousness plays a central role in folk conceptions of free 
will” (926). It is not clear exactly what sense of ‘consciousness’ he has in mind here, however, 
and while the discussion highlights awareness it also hints at phenomenal consciousness. For 
instance, Shepherd states that “the common conception of consciousness involves awareness of 
the world and ourselves,” although he then proceeds to offer illustrations that are typical of 
discussions of phenomenal consciousness, such as “perceptions of vivid red” and “the feel of 
anger” (915). The manipulations in the studies are similarly ambiguous, although each 
emphasizes awareness. Thus, the key notion in the conscious conditions in Studies 1 and 2—
“conscious brain events”—is clarified as “brain events within that person’s awareness” (917), 
while Study 3 focuses on “conscious thoughts and events—thoughts and events within an agent’s 
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awareness” (924). Given this focus, Shepherd’s studies do not allow us to conclude that 
judgments about phenomenal consciousness, specifically, impacted participants’ free will 
judgments.  
Shepherd (2015) extends these results, reporting three further studies involving 
consciousness manipulations, and again concludes that “many laypeople regard consciousness as 
important to free will” (944). We contend that as with the previous studies, it is unclear how 
participants understood the manipulations, a point that Shepherd notes in Section 5. Thus, while 
he takes his studies to “emphasize elements of phenomenal consciousness,” he also notes that 
they “emphasize elements such as deliberation” (942). We’re skeptical that this is the case for 
Shepherd’s first two studies, although it is accurate for his third. In the latter case, however, we 
worry that despite noting elements that philosophers will tend to interpret as emphasizing 
phenomenal consciousness, non-philosophers will nonetheless focus on deliberation. 
The key description in Shepherd’s first study is that the agent at issue (Jim) is said to 
have “no conscious awareness of the right side of his visual field” (932), with the relevant 
manipulation then involving whether Jim punched someone on his left side (such that “Jim was 
consciously aware that he was there”) or on his right side (such that “Jim had no conscious 
awareness that he was there”). As in the previous studies, this manipulation had a strong effect 
on free will judgments, with judgments being significantly higher in the conscious conditions. 
Shepherd’s second study was similar, but now Shepherd describes Jim as having “no conscious 
control over his left hand” and then punching a person with either his left or his right hand. 
Despite this change, the manipulation had a comparable effect on free will judgments.  
In each of Shepherd’s first two studies, while the vignettes involve an agent acting on 
visual information, what they emphasize is conscious awareness (Study 1) or conscious control 
(Study 2). In contrast, Shepherd’s third study clearly emphasizes elements that philosophers 
would tend to interpret in terms of phenomenal consciousness. Participants were given a vignette 
describing a sophisticated robot that was then said to be either conscious or nonconscious: 
In the future, humans develop the technology to construct humanoid machines. These 
machines have very sophisticated computers instead of brains, and very intricate 
movement-generation systems instead of bones, ligaments and muscles. In fact, they are 
so sophisticated that they look, talk, and act just like humans, and they integrate into 
human society with no problem at all. The only way to tell if they are a humanoid 




Conscious: These creations are behaviorally just like human beings, and in addition, 
these creations possess consciousness. They actually feel pain, experience emotions, see 
colors, and consciously deliberate about what to do. 
 
Nonconscious: These creations are behaviorally just like human beings. But, these 
creations do not possess consciousness. They do not actually feel pain (even when they 
say ‘Ouch!’), they do not experience emotions, they do not see colors, and they do not 
consciously deliberate about what to do. 
 
After this, a particular robot was described as performing either a good or a bad action and 
participants were asked a series of questions, including whether the robot acted of his own free 
will. Overall, Shepherd found that while participants tended to attribute free will to the conscious 
robot (M=4.98 on a 1-6 scale), judgments about the nonconscious robot were below midpoint 
(M=2.97). 
 As Shepherd suggests, philosophers are likely to read “actually feel pain, experience 
emotions, see colors” in terms of phenomenal states. This is not the only interpretation available, 
however. Alternatively, it seems plausible to see this as drawing a distinction between actually 
undergoing such states and faking it—the robot merely acting as if it had those states—which is 
arguably neutral with regard to phenomenality. Further, as Shepherd notes, the concluding 
statement that the robot does or does not “consciously deliberate about what to do” can be readily 
understood in terms of another sense of consciousness altogether—one that emphasizes that the 
action was under the robot’s control. Thus, while Shepherd’s studies provide further support for 
the contention that non-philosophers tend to treat consciousness as a requirement for free will, 
they do not provide strong evidence that they tend to treat phenomenal consciousness as a 
requirement.9 
 Nahmias et al. (2020) have recently expanded on Shepherd’s work, reporting the results 
of two studies involving sophisticated robots. Most importantly, in their second study they gave 
participants a vignette based on the one used in Shepherd’s (2015) third study, but with revised 
descriptions for the consciousness manipulation that excluded the potentially problematic 
phrasing noted above (“consciously deliberate”). The revised paragraphs read as follows: 
Conscious: Furthermore, the robots are able to behave just like human beings, and they 
also have components that enable conscious experiences. The robots actually feel pain, 
 
9 More recently, Shepherd (2017) finds an effect for consciousness on free will judgments about a person, with the 
consciousness manipulation emphasizing both control and awareness. And, in a fascinating series of studies, 
Björnsson and Shepherd (2020) reverse things, showing that whether a “humanoid machine” is described as 
operating deterministically or indeterministally affects judgements about whether it has a conscious mental life. 
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see colors, and experience emotions. They do not just appear to be conscious when they 
carry out the same behaviors as humans. 
 
Nonconscious: Furthermore, the robots are able to behave just like human beings even 
though they do not have conscious experiences. They have components that process 
information such that they can carry out all the same behaviors as humans in just the 
same ways, but when they do so, they just appear to feel pain, just appear to see colors, 
and just appear to experience emotions. 
 
After reading one of the vignettes, participants were asked a series of questions involving items 
on free will, basic emotions (e.g., that the robot can feel happiness, anger, etc.), Strawsonian 
emotions (e.g., that the robot can feel guilt, pride, etc.), and conscious sensations, among others, 
answering each using a 7-point scale where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 7 indicates 
strong agreement. 
 Crucially, Nahmias and colleagues found that the consciousness manipulation had a 
significant effect on free will judgements. While this is in line with what Shepherd found in his 
third study, the difference in the mean responses was quite notably smaller than Shepherd 
reports. While Shepherd found a (very) large effect, reporting a partial eta squared of .34 for the 
consciousness manipulation, Nahmias et al. found a small effect, with a partial eta squared of just 
0.014. Unlike Shepherd, they found that participants did not tend to ascribe free will to the robot 
in either condition, with the means for their free will scale falling below the neutral point in both 
the conscious condition (M=3.84) and the unconscious condition (M=3.53).10 Finally, Nahmias 
and colleagues report the results of a multiple mediation analysis indicating that judgements 
about Strawsonian and basic emotions fully mediate the effect of the consciousness manipulation 
on free will judgments, while sensations did not play a significant role. 
 Nahmias et al. take these results to support their contention that there is a “strong 
intuition among most people… that the capacity to have conscious experiences is crucial for free 
will” (61). Their aim, however, is to go beyond this and offer an indication of why people treat 
phenomenal consciousness as being necessary for free will. Nahmias and colleagues suggest that 
the reason is that people hold that for an agent to have free will things have to really matter to the 
agent, and that this requires phenomenal consciousness. They then take the results of their 
 
10 Thanks to Eddy Nahmias and Corey Allen for providing these numbers. 
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mediation analysis to suggest that people take the capacity for phenomenally conscious emotions 
to be crucial for having things truly matter to an agent.11  
 In our view, the consciousness manipulation used by Nahmias and colleagues is notably 
clearer than previous attempts, avoiding explicit mention of awareness, deliberation, or control. 
For a philosophical reader, we have no doubt that the descriptions unambiguously convey that 
they are talking about phenomenal consciousness. We are less convinced, however, that this will 
be so clear for non-philosophers.12 First, as noted in our discussion of the third study in Shepherd 
(2015), one potential issue is that the descriptions intended to flag phenomenal consciousness 
might equally be interpreted as drawing a distinction between actually undergoing such episodes 
and merely faking it. And the added emphasis on whether the robots “just appear” to be 
conscious in Nahmias et al.’s vignettes would seem to further promote such a reading. Second, 
unlike in Shepherd’s study, Nahmias and colleagues report a quite small difference in free will 
ratings between the two conditions. Because of this, even if their descriptions worked as 
intended, we do not find that this result offers strong support for the claim that people generally 
treat phenomenal consciousness as being necessary for free will and believe that caution is 
warranted at this point.   
 In fact, re-considering Shepherd’s results in light of those reported by Nahmias et al., we 
find that they cast significant doubt on the hypothesis that Shepherd’s results reflect judgments 
about phenomenal consciousness. While there are a number of differences between the two 
studies, including the exact phrasing of the vignettes and the questions, Nahmias and colleagues 
based their materials off of Shepherd’s and the phrasing is generally similar. The difference that 
stands out, however, is that Nahmias et al. only emphasized the “phenomenal elements” in the 
consciousness paragraphs, excluding the description of whether the robot could or could not 
consciously deliberate about what to do. Thus, one plausible hypothesis is that the much larger 
effect found by Shepherd primarily reflects judgments about conscious deliberation, not 
phenomenal consciousness. 
 
11 Note that the proposed conceptual connection between consciousness and emotions gains some support from the 
nearest neighbors analysis in Section 1, where “emotion” was one of the ten closest terms to “consciousness” in the 
semantic space. 
12 Arguably in line with this, although it was stipulated that the robot has conscious experiences in the conscious 
condition, the mean responses for the sensation items—e.g., “These robots experience, more than just process, the 
sounds in music, the images in art, the smells of food, and the softness of a blanket.” (70)—was below the neutral 
point. Similarly, despite having specified that the robots actually experience emotions, mean ratings for both basic 
emotions and Stawsonian emotions were below the midpoint. 
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3. Further Explorations 
While the studies discussed above provide considerable evidence that non-philosophers take 
consciousness in some sense to be related to free will, we find it to be far less clear that these 
findings specifically reflect judgments about phenomenal consciousness. Instead, we suspect that 
participants have tended to interpret the consciousness talk in these studies in ways that concern 
being awake, aware, and exercising control. We believe that this alternative explanation is quite 
plausible. First, as noted in Section 1, this cluster of concepts bear a clear relation to free action, 
such that the results are readily explicable on this interpretation. Second, we saw preliminary 
evidence that this cluster corresponds with the dominant ordinary usages of terms like 
‘consciousness’ outside of academia. Third, we saw reason to doubt that non-philosophers tend 
to employ the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness. Thus, absent strong evidence 
to the contrary, we believe the default assumption should be that people will interpret 
consciousness talk in terms of being awake, aware, and exercising control rather than 
phenomenal consciousness. And, fourth, looking across the studies from Shepherd (2015) and 
Nahmias et al. (2020) discussed above, the effect of the consciousness manipulation on free will 
judgments was greatly diminished when reference to ‘conscious deliberation’ was excluded.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, we’ll further explore the relationship between 
consciousness and free will. We begin by returning to the work on the dimensions of mind 
perception discussed above in light of Nahmias et al.’s research, now with a focus on judgments 
about free will and emotions. We then add to this body of work.  
 
3.1 Revisiting the Dimension Studies 
In Section 1, we discussed recent work on the dimensions of mind perception with a focus on 
prototypical phenomenal states such as feeling pain and seeing red. Several of these studies also 
included a question about free will, however, potentially offering insight into how this fits into 
the folk conception of how the mind is organized.  
Perhaps most importantly, Weisman et al. (2017) found that having free will fell within 
the Body dimension, not the Heart dimension as Nahmias et al. might plausibly predict. As 
Weisman et al. put it, “having free will tracked the physiological phenomena of the body more 
closely than the social-emotional capacities of the heart” (11376). We saw above that Nahmias et 
al.’s basic picture is that one crucial aspect of thinking about an agent having free will is that 
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things can truly matter to the agent, and they suggest that this in turn requires phenomenal 
consciousness—that the agent can experience the consequences of her actions—focusing 
especially on the ability to feel emotions. But Weisman et al.’s work doesn’t fit cleanly with this 
picture. As noted above, the Body dimension is characterized in terms of bodily sensations and 
capacities related to meeting biological needs. And while some basic emotions fall under this 
dimension, they relate especially to biological safety (e.g., experiencing fear, feeling safe). In 
contrast, most emotions fell under Weisman et al.’s Heart dimension. Recalling that these 
dimensions reflect the items that tended to be treated as going together across a range of entities, 
what we take this to suggest is that people tend to treat free will as being a more biologically 
basic feature of living animals than social emotions.13  
Interestingly, Weisman et al. also found that being conscious and being self-aware fell 
under the Body dimensions. This is plausibly in keeping with the analysis of ‘consciousness’ in 
Section 1 and the alternative explanation we offered of the effect of consciousness manipulations 
on free will judgments. It suggests a basic biological conception of consciousness that is 
congruent with a focus on being awake, aware, and exercising control. We might think of these 
as “abilities related to the physical, biological body” of living animals, as Weisman et al. (11375) 
describe the Body dimension.14 
 While the results for Ozdemir’s (2021) dimension studies are largely congruent with 
Weisman et al.’s findings, they paint a less clear picture with regard to having free will. In his 
first study, this item did not load especially strongly on any of the dimensions he identified, 
while the various emotions tested grouped together under either the Negative State or Positive 
State dimensions. In Ozdemir’s second study, however, both having free will and having 
emotions fell within his broad Consciousness and Agency dimension, as did items like being 
alive and being aware of oneself. While this is congruent with the picture drawn from Weisman 
et al., it is also compatible with Nahmias et al.’s contention that free will is more closely tied to 
feeling emotions. As such, we conclude by expanding upon Ozdemir’s second study, reporting 
 
13 Compare, for example, the neutral to positive mean ratings for having free will for a beetle, goat, and elephant to 
the low mean ratings for feeling embarrassed and experiencing guilt for these animals in Weisman et al.’s Figure 1. 
14 Recall that “aliveness” was one of the nearest neighbors for “consciousness” in the analysis above. See Arico et 
al. (2011) for experimental evidence that judgments that something is alive might be a basic cue for a range of 
mental state attributions.  
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the results of a new study based on his materials and employing an analysis aimed at revealing 
the relations between the items comprising his broad Consciousness and Agency dimension. 
 
3.2 Clustering Attributions 
To further explore the relationship between the items in Ozdemir’s (2021) second study, we 
tested two variations on his vignette. We then employed bottom-up cluster analyses to help 
assess the patterns of judgments across the 25 capacities he tested.  
As detailed above, the vignette for Ozdemir’s study involved a person’s brain being 
scanned to create a computer simulation that was then embedded in a robot body. We updated 
this to further emphasize that the resulting being was a physical duplicate of the original person, 
doing so in two different ways. The first variation stuck closely to Ozdemir’s original scenario, 
but specified that both the person’s brain and body were scanned to build an android duplicate. 
The second variation went further, replacing the android with a “molecule by molecule” 
biological duplicate reminiscent of philosophical zombies (Chalmers 1996), and specifying that 
it was only the physical make-up of the person that was duplicated, such that “if there was any 
non-physical aspect to the person—such as a non-physical soul or mind—the scientists would 
not be able to duplicate that aspect of the person.” Participants were given one of the two 
vignettes, then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each of the 25 statements used by 
Ozdemir (with “duplicate” replacing “robot”), in random order, answering on a 1–7 scale where 
1 indicates “Disagree Strongly” and 7 indicates “Agree Strongly.” In addition, they were asked a 
range of demographic and check questions. Participants were recruited globally through 
advertising for a free personality test on Google Ads, with the ad and questionnaire presented in 
English. Responses were collected from 886 participants who were at least 16 years of age and 
completed the philosophical questions. The full text for both vignettes, as well as extended 
details about the questions, sample, and analysis are provided in the supplemental materials.15 
For space, we’ll focus on giving just a high-level overview of the findings here.16 Results are 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
15 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19556  
16 Given the diversity of the sample exploratory tests were run to check for demographic differences. As few notable 





Figure 1: Study results broken down by condition, with the relative percentage of participants 
selecting each response option shown in gray and the mean and 95% confidence interval overlaid 
in black.  
 
 
 To assess differences between the conditions, Welch’s t-tests were run for each of the 25 
items, applying the Holm–Bonferroni correction. Only three showed a significant difference, and 
even here the effect sizes were small: ratings for [2] Feel Pain, [18] Alive, and [23] Deserve 
Human Rights were significantly higher for the Physical Duplicate (M=4.88, 4.96, 5.07) than the 
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Android (M=4.25, 4.47, 4.46).17 To assess general agreement or disagreement with the items, we 
ran one-sample Student’s t-tests with the Holm–Bonferroni correction for each condition. Each 
item was above and significantly different from the midpoint, with the exception of [12] Have 
Dreams during Sleep for the Android. Thus, interestingly, participants tended to treat the android 
as being alive, although there was disagreement on this score. And the general agreement found 
for [19] Conscious casts further doubt on the claim that “problem intuitions” are widespread 
(Chalmers 2018), and specifically intuitions that consciousness is non-physical (see Footnote 7). 
 For present purposes, though, our primary concern is with the relation between different 
judgments about the duplicates. To assess this, we began by calculating distance matrixes for the 
items using two distance measures (Euclidean, Spearman). These provide measures of how 
similar participants’ responses were between each pair of items. Euclidean, or straight-line 
distance, is perhaps the most common in hierarchical clustering and is often treated as the 
default. This method treats the ratings as having interval scale, however, and while this is a 
common assumption for Likert-ratings, it might not hold. The Spearman distance measure, by 
contrast, is a rank-based correlation metric. As detailed in the supplemental materials, the results 
were similar for each measure. This includes that pairs of items that we expected to be treated 
similarly were in fact close together on both measures, offering some indication that participants 
understood the task: [3] See Colors was the closest item to [4] Experience Sights & Sounds for 
each, and vice versa, with this being the closest pair overall by Euclidean distance; and likewise 
for [13] Have Emotions and [14] Have Moods, which were the closest pair overall by Spearman 
distance. By contrast, [1] Have Free Will was not so notably close to [13] Have Emotions on 
either measure, with [14] Have Moods, [15] Have Self-consciousness, [16] Have a Personality, 
and [12] Have Dreams during Sleep being closer on each (and [23] Deserve Human Rights, [9] 
Think, [2] Feel Pain, and [11] Capable of Morality also being closer using Spearman distance). 
 
17 The result for [2] Feel Pain is in keeping with previous work indicating that what an agent’s body is made of 
impacts people’s pain judgments (Sytsma 2012). Similarly, the results for the other two statements seem readily 





Figure 2: Dendrogram for the hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method with the 
Euclidian distance measure. Edge numbers are displayed below (grey) and AU values are 
displayed above (black). Highest-level clusters occurring in 95% or more of the resamples are 
highlighted. Item numbers correspond with those given in Figure 1. 
 
 
 To better assess the patterns of similarity between item ratings, we performed a series of 
agglomerative hierarchical cluster analyses. This works in a bottom-up manner based on the 
distance matrix, starting with each item being considered as a single-element cluster, then 
iteratively combining the most ‘similar’ clusters until all items are grouped together. By working 
in a bottom-up manner, agglomerative clustering tends to do a better job of identifying smaller 
clusters, making it a good choice for present purposes. The specific clustering produced depends 
not only on the distance measure, but on the clustering method employed. We tested five 
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clustering methods for each of the two distance measures. These were then assessed with two 
goals in mind—faithfulness to the distance matrix and the strength of clustering produced. Based 
on this, we identified the two best methods for each measure. This included what is perhaps the 
most common combination—Ward’s method with Euclidean distance. We’ll focus on this 
clustering here, but the other three analyses paint a similar picture, as detailed in the 
supplemental materials. To assess the uncertainty of the analyses we used a resampling method 
with 10k iterations to produce approximately unbiased (AU) p-values. This gives the percentage 
of iterations where the same cluster was found, and we highlight clusters with values of 95 or 
greater in the dendrograms. The dendrogram for Ward’s method with Euclidean distance is 
shown in Figure 2.  
The first thing to note is that the two high-level clusters in the dendrogram largely 
correspond with the dimensions found by Ozdemir (with the exception of [5] Make Choices and 
[8] Display Creativity), while the lowest-level clusters include the pairs of items discussed above 
that were expected to be similar ([3] See Colors and [4] Experience Sights & Sounds, [13] Have 
Emotions and [14] Have Moods). This offers some validation for the clustering. Further, in line 
with Ozdemir’s findings, we again find that the prototypical examples of phenomenal states—[2] 
Feel Pain and [3] See Colors / [4] Experience Sights & Sounds—fell across different top-level 
clusters. This adds to the findings discussed in Section 1, lending further support to Sytsma and 
Machery’s (2010) conclusion.  
Most importantly for present purposes, looking more closely at the structure produced, 
we find that [1] Have Free Will falls in a mid-level cluster with [18] Alive, [23] Deserve Human 
Rights, [19] Conscious, [15] Have Self-consciousness, and [20] Aware of Self. This is in line with 
the expected connection between free will and consciousness, further suggesting that people treat 
these as going together. In contrast, while [1] Have Free Will falls within the same top-level 
cluster as [13] Have Emotions, they weren’t otherwise especially close, with [13] Have Emotions 
grouping together with the bodily state of [2] Feel Pain as well as [12] Have Dreams during 
Sleep. This is largely congruent with the picture drawn from Weisman et al.’s work. The 
structure again suggests that people treat free will as being closely connected to consciousness 
and self-awareness, with these being tied to being alive and moral patiency. While we consider 
these results to best be thought of as exploratory, we also find them to be congruent with the 
picture we’ve suggested: Even focusing on sci-fi examples reminiscent of philosophical thought 
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experiments, we find that judgments about free will, consciousness, and self-awareness are 
closely connected to judgments about being alive, suggesting that these form a basic cluster in 
people’s thinking that is congruent with thinking about consciousness in terms of being awake, 
aware, and exercising control.  
 
4. Conclusion 
A large body of empirical evidence indicates that the judgments of non-philosophers about 
consciousness and free will are related. And some have interpreted the former in terms of the 
philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness, with Nahmias et al. (2020) suggesting that 
people treat the capacity for phenomenally conscious emotions as critical for having free will. 
Several other bodies of research, however, at the very least indicate that caution is warranted 
with regard to interpreting non-philosophers’ understanding of consciousness in this way. 
Further, standard dictionary definitions and a preliminary corpus analysis support this 
conclusion. A critical look at several key empirical studies casts doubt on their providing 
evidence for there being a close relationship between non-philosophers’ judgments about free 
will and phenomenal consciousness. This skeptical conclusion is further supported by the results 
a new exploratory study, which suggests that attributions of free will are not so closely tied to 
attributions of emotions. Rather we suggest that both free will and consciousness are treated as 
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